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The upside of gridlock: why a divided US government may support markets
Yannik Zufferey, PhD
Chief Investment Officer, Core Business
LOIM Core investment teams
key takeaways.
US midterm election results have created a divided government, increasing the likelihood of political stalemate and the use of presidential vetoes as a policy tool
Gridlock could support markets by limiting fiscal expansion and increasing incentives to end the Iran war, helping to ease pressure on bond yields and energy prices
State-level restrictions on data-centre development are a risk to the AI capex investment outlook, but any rollbacks are more likely to slow growth and spread the expansion to other sectors than end it.
How the US midterm elections could impact markets
The recent US midterm elections saw dissatisfaction with the direction of White House policy expressed emphatically at the ballot box1. The election results offer a damning verdict on President Donald Trump’s second term, but how could they impact markets?
At the heart of the backlash was the very issue that helped deliver a Republican victory in 2024: the cost of living. While US inflation is no longer at crisis levels, it remains sticky, while average wage growth is no longer fully offsetting its impact. Voter dissatisfaction with the situation saw Democrats capture seven Republican-held Senate seats, including several in traditionally Republican states such as Texas and North Carolina.
In our view, the evolving scenario marks neither the end of US
expansion nor the demise of AI as an investment theme
This political shift has three important consequences for the economy and markets. Firstly, a divided government is likely to produce legislative gridlock, with Trump relying heavily on presidential vetoes to block the new Democratic congressional majority’s agenda. Secondly, the impasse should limit fiscal expansion and incentivise ending the war on Iran, which would both be constructive for the US economy. Thirdly, data centre investment now faces a growing risk of state-level regulation, an area beyond the reach of presidential veto.
So, what is the US midterm elections’ market impact? Markets initially focused on the negative, however, we see the implications as more balanced: in our view, the evolving scenario marks neither the end of US expansion nor the demise of AI as an investment theme.
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History suggests a key role for the presidential veto
The midterms have changed the political map of the US for the remaining two years of President Trump’s term. The scale of this shift is unusual: Democrats took Republican-held Senate seats in Maine, Iowa, Ohio, Kansas, Texas, North Carolina and South Carolina – in Texas, no Democrat had won a statewide race in more than 30 years.
Motives invoked to explain the result highlighted inflation and the cost of living, along with the war in Iran, the rise in gasoline prices and social issues. More locally, a backlash against the data centres being built in several states was also a key factor. At the time of writing, the Democrats now hold 55 seats in the Senate together with at least 254 in the House of Representatives, with a handful of races still to be called.
What typically happens next is well documented. A president facing a hostile Congress can use his veto to block legislation he opposes, while overriding a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Democrats do not have such a majority, making gridlock the most likely outcome. Meanwhile, the nomination of Stephen Miller as White House Chief of Staff following the election points towards a more confrontational approach that is only likely to exacerbate the situation.
History shows how sharply veto activity can increase when control of Congress changes hands, as Figure 1 illustrates. For example, former President Bill Clinton did not use his veto while Democrats controlled Congress in 1993 and 1994; however, after the Republicans took control, he issued 37 vetoes during the remainder of his presidency. Similarly, all 10 vetoes of Trump's first term came after the Democrats took control of the House. The message is simple: a divided government tends to make the presidential veto a much more important policy tool.
FIG. 1. Number of US presidential vetoes by year since 19502
When gridlock is good for markets
While a split between the legislative and executive branches is an issue for effective government, the second half of presidential terms are generally a good period for markets. In fact, US equities have risen in the 12 months following each of the past 14 midterm elections.
Figure 2 shows the average performance of US equities following the 19 midterm elections between 1950 and 2022, depending on the resulting political configuration. Historically, the average path has been stronger when the election resulted in gridlock than when the president’s party retained control of Congress. By tying policymakers’ hands and limiting the scope for disruptive policy changes, gridlock tends to work in markets’ favour.
FIG. 2. S&P 500 performance around US midterm elections, by outcome for the president’s party3
Is 2026 different? Probably not, for two reasons specific to the current environment.
The budget:Gridlock makes it harder to approve measures that add to the deficit, and this limits the fiscal risk that has weighed on the US bond market in recent months, as the fiscal risk premium along the US curve normalised. A Congress that blocks new spending and new tax cuts alike is a Congress that stops adding to the deficit, and this is what the bond market has been seeking – or at least what its bond vigilantes have been asking for
The war in Iran: As Vice President JD Vance acknowledged, the war affected the election result. If the President wants his approval ratings to recover, he needs to relieve pressure on prices by ending the war. High oil prices are a tax on consumption, and a heavy one when wage growth is as weak as it has been recently.
The combination of gridlock and reduced political cohesion could therefore be supportive for the US economy, as well as the market for USD-denominated debt: lower yields and potentially lower energy costs would remove two factors that help explain the K-shaped pattern of growth that creates inequalities between citizens. From that perspective, the historical pattern of equity gains after midterms could well hold again, once the dust settles from the selloff that spread from data centre suppliers to the entire AI trade.
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AI capex investment outlook
The potential regulation of AI and US data centre development could cloud this positive story, however. An anti-AI backlash has gained some momentum, notably in Texas where the newly elected Democratic administration has signalled a tougher stance on data centre expansion. This is significant given that the state accounts for roughly 27% of planned US data-centre capacity.
More broadly, states where newly elected Democrats have advocated tighter restrictions on data-centre development account for roughly 45% of planned US data-centre capacity. In practice, this means the AI capex investment outlook is either for a freeze on new construction of data centres or supply-side bottlenecks – which explains the sector's derating in equities last week.
The presidential veto cannot prevent Democrat-led measures at the state level. The simple story of gridlock lifting equities is therefore challenged by this emerging scenario. However, three points put this risk to the US data centre investment outlook in perspective.
Restrictions are likely to be temporary. Is the US likely to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs? As Figure 3 shows, AI has accounted for about 20% of US growth recently – or roughly 0.3 percentage points; on average the contribution of corporate investment has increased from 0.44% to 0.6% since the advent of AI. No state, Texas least of all, can afford to give that up for long. The restrictions are therefore more likely to be temporary freezes than permanent bans.
Restrictions are on AI capex investment, not demand. In terms of market impact, what is at stake is a reduction in AI capex, not a collapse in demand. Supply-side bottlenecks are, if anything, a sign that demand is outpacing supply. With the market trading at 18 times forward earnings – and those earnings still growing – this is not the end of the cycle.
Lower data centre investment reduces pressure on interest rates. Lower rates are good news for more balanced growth. Residential investment fell 3.3% in Q3 2026, continuing a persistent contraction over the past four years caused by high long-term rates; since 2022, the residential sector’s contribution to US growth has been negative, at -0.38% (Figure 3). This part of the economy would benefit first from the easier financing conditions lower AI capex could allow, since investment projects globally compete for funding from available savings.
FIG. 3. Comparative decomposition of US growth, 1996-2021 vs. 2022-20264
Taken together, the implications of the midterm results look more supportive than the initial market reaction suggests. For bonds, the outlook is positive: lower fiscal risk and potentially slower capex increase the scope for yields to fall. This would also support equities, particularly growth stocks. AI capacity constraints remain a source of uncertainty, but they pose a risk to the pace of earnings growth, not necessarily to the direction of earnings. This distinction matters: with equities trading at 18 times forward earnings and profits still growing, a slowdown would not in itself mark the end of the cycle.
The more lasting consequence could be a broader diffusion of growth and investment opportunities. Cheaper oil prices would ease the pressure on consumers and businesses, while more favourable financing conditions would allow capital to flow beyond the AI industry towards those parts of the economy that have suffered most from high rates. Rather than bringing the expansion to an end, the midterms could therefore prove instrumental in extending it across a wider range of sectors and regions.
The election outcome may affect markets through its influence on fiscal policy, legislative gridlock, bond yields, energy prices and investor expectations. The article argues that political gridlock could limit fiscal expansion, while state-level restrictions on data-centre development could constrain the pace of AI investment.
Historically, US equities have performed more strongly on average after midterm elections that resulted in gridlock than when the president’s party retained control of Congress. The article describes how limits on new spending could reduce fiscal risk and limits to the Iran war could lower energy prices.
The outlook faces uncertainty from state-level regulation and possible supply-side bottlenecks. The article’s view is that restrictions are more likely to slow or redistribute expansion than bring data-centre investment to a permanent end.
The article argues that the main risk is a slower pace of AI capital expenditure rather than a collapse in demand. It also notes that lower investment could ease pressure on interest rates and allow capital to flow to other parts of the economy.
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1 The US midterm elections market impact refers to how the election outcome may affect economic policy, financial markets and investor expectations. In this article, the key factors include government gridlock, fiscal policy, bond yields, energy prices and investment in data centres and AI. 2 Bloomberg, LOIM. For illustrative purposes only. As at 31 October 2026. Reading note: Sample covers the period from 1950 to 2026, with 2026 figures for January to October. Each bar counts the bills vetoed during a session year. A regular veto is a bill returned to Congress with the President's objections, which Congress can override with a two-thirds majority in both chambers; a pocket veto is a bill left unsigned after Congress has adjourned, which fails without any possible override. Shaded areas mark the years in which the House majority did not belong to the President's party. 3 Bloomberg, LOIM calculations. For illustrative purposes only. As at 6 November 2026. 4 Bloomberg, LOIM. For illustrative purposes only. As at 9 November 2026.
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