When you visit our website, information may be stored or recovered on your device, mainly in the form of cookies. We use essential cookies to ensure the website works as it should, and statistical and marketing cookies for audience measurement and content customisation purposes. We rely on Google to store your consent choices and manage the activation of cookies accordingly. For more information on this, please also refer to the Google policy on Business Data Responsibility.
From the Cookie Management Centre, you can set your preferences with respect to the use of cookies: accept or reject certain categories, accept all, or reject all. For detailed information on all cookies used across these three categories, please refer to our Cookie Policy.
Please note that blocking certain cookies may affect your experience and the services offered.
Essential cookies Always active
Essential cookies help the website to work as it should by enabling necessary functionalities, such as navigating between pages and accessing secure areas. These cannot be disabled in our systems.
Statistical cookies
Statistical cookies help us understand how visitors interact with our site by collecting and communicating browsing information. They make it possible to identify the most and least visited pages and to improve the overall performance of the site.
Marketing cookies
Marketing cookies are used to display relevant advertising and measure the performance of campaigns. If you choose not to allow these cookies, you will continue to see ads, but they will be less relevant to your interests.
Choose the purposes for which we may use Google products to collect and use your data:
User storage: to technically permit advertising functionality.
User data for advertising: to optimise our advertising campaigns.
Ad customisation: to tailor advertising to your interests.
Stagflation or Goldilocks? The investment clock is running backwards
Florian Ielpo, PhD
Head of Macro
Ardit Daci
Investment Intern
key takeaways.
The Hormuz oil shock has made stagflation the default narrative, yet macro and micro signals currently point to resilient or accelerating activity, and moderate inflation
Overheating growth does not mechanically lead to stagflation, as the investment clock suggests. Historically, almost half the episodes of strong growth have led to a Goldilocks phase
We explain why productivity and the cost of capital will be pivotal in determining which turn the investment clock could take next.
As its name suggests, the Investment clock – a model showing key stages of the economic cycle and corresponding asset-class exposures – usually moves mechanically through a series of phases. From growth to inflation, then stagflation and weaker demand, which leads to a disinflationary slowdown before recovery paves the way for a resurgence of growth. The economic fallout from the US-Iran war should have progressed like clockwork: the oil-supply shock would stoke inflation, erode purchasing power and corporate margins, and leave central banks with less room to support activity. This logic made stagflation the natural macro narrative in March and April.
But markets see a different story. Equity and credit remain resilient, earnings indicate solid demand and growth indicators have not collapsed. Meanwhile, labour-market pressure is cooling and inflation breadth has weakened. Either markets are complacent about the damage still to come, or the economy is not moving into the stagflation quadrant of the investment clock, as anticipated. In this issue of Simply put, we ask whether the investment clock may be ticking in reverse – from overheating growth back to Goldilocks rather than on to stagflation.
The regime research starts with a simple observation: neither the economy nor asset returns are generated by one stable distribution. Academic James Hamilton1 formalised business-cycle shifts between latent states, while Andrew Ang and Geert Bekaert2 and Massimo Guidolin and Allan Timmermann3 showed that expected returns, volatility and correlations can change jointly across regimes. The implication for portfolio construction is important: an allocation that appears diversified may be concentrated in one macro state because two different assets can hedge one another in one regime and move together in another.
An all-weather portfolio must navigate these regimes without having to forecast them, and the recent past has made that harder. The classic 50/50 equity-bond portfolio has struggled since 2020 because of rates risk, and even Harry Browne's permanent portfolio – seen as the archetype of all-weather investing, as it aims to balance the economic risk among assets – is now up for debate. For that reason, regime frequencies are an essential input into the portfolio construction of our All Roads strategies. In a recent piece4, we illustrate how regime-level information can be incorporated directly within a risk parity framework – the bread and butter of our All Roads strategies.
This research also warns against treating the investment clock as a mechanical calendar. What matters is not just the current quadrant, but the probability of moving to each possible destination and the return distribution conditional on that transition. The clock should therefore be read as a probabilistic map, not as a metronome. That distinction is particularly important today, because returning from overheating growth to a Goldilocks scenario, or a move into stagflation, imply radically different outcomes for equities, bonds and commodities.
sign up for our monthly newsletter.
Thank you for subscribing to our monthly newsletter!
There was an error registering your subscription. Please email loim-digital@lombardodier.com.
Major economies today are too strong for stagflation
Figure 1 uses the monthly averages of our growth and inflation diffusion indices for the US, Switzerland, Europe and China based on our latest nowcasting signals. The vertical axis measures the share of data showing improving growth; the horizontal axis measures the share of data that indicates rising inflation. The two 50% thresholds divide the clock into its four familiar quadrants.
Since December 2025, the US has moved sharply to the left, with inflation breadth below 50% and growth breadth above 50% placing the economy in a Goldilocks scenario. Switzerland has also moved towards lower inflation and sits close to the boundary between expansion and Goldilocks. Europe has moved further into expansion as activity improves, although its productivity data is not yet sending a signal as strong as in the US. China remains the outlier, residing in the stagflation quadrant, with weaker growth breadth and elevated inflation breadth. In spite of this progression in inflation pressure, the absolute level of inflation in China remains low.
FIG 1. Investment clock based on monthly averages of growth and inflation diffusion indices (DIs), December 2025 and July 20265
The global picture shows some heterogeneity, but it is not one of synchronised stagflation. The key movement for the US and Europe is their anti-clockwise turns. How often have such moves previously happened?
Tock, tick: the investment clock can move anti-clockwise
Contrary to the clock, history shows that shifting from expansion to stagflation is only one of several possible paths. Figure 2 records the destination regimes from previous exits from expansion. Stagflation followed in 41% of cases and a disinflationary slowdown followed in 12%. However, the most frequent destination was a direct return to a Goldilocks scenario, which occurred in 47% of observations.
Ticking backwards, therefore, is neither unusual nor economically incoherent. Expansion can end through demand destruction, but it can also cease through improved supply. New investment can expand capacity; productivity can absorb wage growth; labour shortages can ease without mass unemployment and inflation can fall before final demand does. In that configuration, nominal growth contains more real output and less inflation. The clock tends to move left before it moves down.
This is also why the present signal remains conditional rather than definitive. A renewed rise in services inflation would push the economy back towards a textbook stagflation path. Conversely, continued productivity gains and softer wage-sensitive inflation would validate a backward rotation. The current data lean towards the second outcome, but this remains uncertain for now.
FIG 2. Historical regimes observed after exiting an expansion period6
Why the type of growth can predict the clock’s next turn
The distinction is not just one of semantics. Figure 3 shows annualised asset-class performance after an expansion period, based on the regime that followed. When the economy moved from expansion into stagflation, the S&P 500 returned about -12% on an annualised basis. When it shifted back towards a Goldilocks scenario, equity performance exceeded 20%. The gap between the two paths is therefore greater than 30 percentage points. Government and corporate bonds performed best in a disinflationary slowdown, while commodities provided their clearest relative support in stagflation.
FIG 3. Annualised performance of asset classes after leaving an expansion period, conditional on the subsequent regime7
This historical pattern can help explain current price action. Equities and credit have behaved better than a stagflation diagnosis would suggest, but that does not mean markets are enjoying unrestricted valuation expansion. The marginal cost of capital has risen and continues to cap multiples. Strong earnings are doing more of the work than re-rating. That is consistent with an economy moving towards a better growth-inflation mix while discount rates remain restrictive.
Two macro triggers will now matter most. The first is productivity, because it determines whether growth signifies margin growth rather than renewed inflation; evidence of improving margins is currently stronger in the US than in Europe. The second is the cost of capital, because it determines how much investors will pay for those margins. A decline in financing costs would enable the improvement in fundamentals to become a multiple expansion. Until then, a backwards-moving clock is constructive for risk assets and less hostile to duration, but it remains an earnings-led rather than valuation-led Goldilocks scenario.
Simply put, the investment clock may be ticking backwards. The current scenario appears to be more like an expansion rotating towards a Goldilocks state than an economy entering stagflation.
To learn more about our All Roads multi-asset strategy, click here.
Macro/nowcasting corner
The most recent evolution of our proprietary nowcasting indicators for global growth, global inflation surprises, and global monetary policy surprises is designed to track the recent progression of macroeconomic factors driving the markets.
Our nowcasting indicators currently show:
Our growth nowcaster has continued to strengthen, reaching the 50% threshold. The signal is now in a high and rising regime
Our global inflation signals have declined across all regions. The nowcaster remains in a high but declining regime
There has been no change in our global monetary policy indicator. The only notable move was in China, where the signal declined as prices data weakened. This was offset by an increase in the US signal.
World growth nowcaster: long-term (left) and recent evolution (right)
World inflation nowcaster: long-term (left) and recent evolution (right)
World monetary policy nowcaster: long-term (left) and recent evolution (right)
Reading note: LOIM’s nowcasting indicator gather economic indicators in a point-in-time manner in order to measure the likelihood of a given macro risk – growth, inflation surprises and monetary policy surprises. The nowcaster varies between 0% (low growth, low inflation surprises and dovish monetary policy) and 100% (the high growth, high inflation surprises and hawkish monetary policy).
view sources.
+
1 Jorgenson, D. W., (1963) “Capital Theory and Investment Behavior”. American Economic Review. JSTOR
2 Hall, R. E. and Jorgenson, D. W., (1967) “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior”. American Economic Review, 1967. JSTOR
3 Laubach, T. and Williams, J. C., (2003) “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest”. Review of Economics and Statistics. JSTOR
4 Holston, K., Laubach, T. and Williams, J. C., (2016) “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants”. Journal of International Economics. Federal Reserve
5 Rachel, L., and Summers, L., (2019) “On Falling Neutral Real Rates, Fiscal Policy, and the Risk of Secular Stagnation”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Brookings
6 Caballero, R. J., Farhi, E. and Gourinchas, P-O., (2017) “The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. American Economic Association
7 Bloomberg, LOIM. As at 18 June 2026. For illustrative purposes only.
8 Bloomberg, LOIM. As at 18 June 2026. Productivity is derived from a ‘Solow-style’ regression of GDP growth on investment and population growth. For illustrative purposes only.
9 Bloomberg, LOIM. As at 18 June 2026. For illustrative purposes only.
important information.
For professional investors use only
This document is a Corporate Communication for Professional Investors only and is not a marketing communication related to a fund, an investment product or investment services in your country. This document is not intended to provide investment, tax, accounting, professional or legal advice.